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INVITED PAPER
A Profile of Prolonged, Persistent SSH Attack on a Kippo Based
Honeynet
Craig Valli, Priya Rabadia and Andrew Woodard
Security Research Institute
Edith Cowan University
sri@ecu.edu.au
ABSTRACT
This paper is an investigation focusing on activities detected by SSH honeypots that utilised kippo
honeypot software. The honeypots were located across a variety of geographical locations and
operational platforms. The honeynet has suffered prolonged, persistent and attack from a /24 network
which appears to be of Chinese geographical origin. In addition to these attacks, other attackers have
been successful in compromising real hosts in a wide range of other countries that were subsequently
involved in attacking the honeypot machines in the honeynet.
Keywords: Cyber Security, SSH, Secure Shell, Honeypots, Kippo
INTRODUCTION
This paper is an investigation focusing on activities detected by Secure Shell (SSH) honeypots that
utilise the kippo honeypot software (desaster, 2015). This paper is part of an ongoing investigation,
with initial work conducted in 2012 and 2013 (Valli, 2012; Valli, Rabadia, & Woodward, 2013). All
SSH honeypots were configured identically using kippo source code.
The focus of this particular research is primarily to identify evidence of automated attacks using
password wordlists being implemented to login and gain access to three kippo SSH honeypots. All
honeypots have the same username and password databases that contain multiple valid login password
combinations. These valid combinations are part of the deception that is presented to the attacking
entity by the kippo SSH honeypot. The passwords in these lists are drawn from well-known weak
password lists. The honeypots are configured in kippo to present as different hostnames. The
machines are further differentiated by manipulating some of the files in the fake filesystem used by
kippo.
This paper examined a specific attack that has propagated since November 2014 and continues as of
the time of writing. What is unique about the attack is that all previous attempts to attack the
honeypots were detected as originating from UNIX based systems utilising SSH clients. The SSH
attacks are now appearing to be coming from machines that utilise the PUTTY SSH suite of tools on
Windows platform operating systems. Furthermore, the volume of SSH login attempts evinced on the

honeynet in the past four months has increased at a rate of growth which is approaching that of
exponential. This significant increase in attempts is likely due to Windows operating system based
computers comprising a significant share of the market, and reportedly in excess of 97% in China
(Popa, 2015).
OVERVIEW OF THE SETUP OF THE KIPPO SSH HONEYNET
A honeynet can readily be described as a controlled and centrally administered collection of
honeypots. The kippo SSH honeypot is a medium interaction honeypot, meaning that the honeypot
imitates some functions that would exhibited by a live system (Hosting, 2013; Stevens & Pohl, 2004).
The kippo honeypot is designed to effectively mimic an SSH server to an attacking entity. The SSH
protocol is designed to securely transmit data using a point to point encryption tunnel (Ciampa, 2010),
provides high grade encryption, and is a secure replacement for plaintext terminal programs such as
telnet or rsh on UNIX or UNIX-like operating systems (Linux, OpenBSD, FreeBSD). Most network
connected UNIX or UNIX-like operating systems have SSH installed as a client, and it is often
included as a server (daemon) to help protect systems by providing a platform for encrypted
communications. There are also many SSH clients available to run from Windows operating system
based computers, with Putty being a commonly used Windows client (Tatham, 2015).
kippo honeypots are designed to collect data from attacker interaction with an emulated SSH service.
The emulated SSH service is provided by an open-source, Python based event-driven program called
Twisted (TwistedMatrixLabs, 2013). Twisted provides the libraries that are utilised and deployed by
kippo to imitate a valid encrypted SSH session to an entity. Relevant SSH artefacts are also extracted,
including the SSH banner or string that the daemon or clients presents to connecting SSH entities.
Each of these banners or strings are typically unique and in many cases can reliably fingerprint the
connecting operating system and device. Fingerprinting is a term used in network security to describe
the data which is sent by a computer when it is connect to over a network, and this data is considered
to be unique to each operating system, and in some cases different versions of a given operating
system. Kippo allows the honeypot user to change the SSH banner to any known valid fingerprints for
SSH.
The honeypot also emulates a logically correct, but manufactured file system to present to the user
who successfully gains access to the honeypot. The system also presents falsified system reporting
and allows interaction with artefacts such as /proc/cpuinfo or .bash_history logfile. While the level of
deception in the default setting is limited, this functionality is able to be expanded and modified at
will. For this experiment, key elements were modified such as /proc entries and different bash entries
to create a difference in each of the kippo hosts presented in the honeypots.

The kippo SSH honeypots are written in Python, and installed using the recommended process.
Source code was obtained from https://github.com/ikoniaris/kippo which is modified kippo code. The
setup for these particular systems used in the data collection was conducted as specified by the
BruteForce Lab Guide (Labs, 2011) and further enhanced to send data to various database stores
Postgresql, Mysql and also an ElasticSearch server. This setup deviates from the original kippo SSH
documentation in that it uses the authbind daemon instead of twistd as the initial connecting daemon
for the service. This configuration lets authbind handle the binding of the twistd as a non-root user to
a low numbered TCP port and passes this to the twistd daemon. This configuration was found to be
more consistent, reliable and secure during the conduct of the research project.
During the installation process, a local MySQL database was configured and secured to record all the
interactions with the kippo honeypots. Figure 1 is a table from (Valli, 2012) which was sourced from
the kippo documentation. It shows the MySQL database structure used in the kippo honeypots that
was used to record all the interaction data.
TABLE auth

TABLE input

id int(11) PK,

id int(11)NOT NULL PK

session char(32) NOT NULL,

session char(32) NOT NULL,

success tinyint(1) NOT NULL,

timestamp datetime NOT NULL,

username varchar(100) NOT NULL,

realm varchar(50) default NULL,

password varchar(100) NOT NULL,

success tinyint(1) default NULL,

timestamp datetime NOT NULL,

input text NOT NULL,
KEY session (session,timestamp,realm)

TABLE clients

TABLE sensors

id int(4) PK

id int(11) NOT NULL (PK)

version varchar(50) NOT NULL

ip varchar(15) NOT NULL

TABLE sessions

TABLE ttylog

id char(32) NOT NULL PK

id int(11) NOT NULL PK

starttime datetime NOT NULL,

session char(32) NOT NULL

endtime datetime default NULL,

ttylog mediumblob NOT NULL

sensor int(4) NOT NULL,
ip varchar(15) NOT NULL default '',
termsize varchar(7) default NULL,
client int(4) default NULL,
KEY starttime (starttime,sensor)

Figure 1 - MySQL database structure for kippo honeypot
After recording to the local MySQL database, these data are then transmitted to a centralised
Postgresql SQL server (Valli et al., 2013). Communication is achieved using a Python extension that
uses a Postgresql driver to connect to the SURFIDS system IDS logging server (IDS, 2013). The
centralised logging server utilises the SURFIDS system for storing the data from the honeypots into
an aggregated PostgreSQL database. The database has functions and tables specifically for the kippo
honeypots data. In addition, the honeypots running kippo operate Dionaea and Glastopf, which in turn
report to the SURFIDS instance. It should be noted that these data are not used in this analysis or
reported here.
The entire honeynet had its kippo code modified to support transmission of attack data to an
Elasticsearch instance. In addition to storing the data in local MySQL databases, this code allows the
researchers to concurrently transmit it to an ElasticSearch engine ("Elasticsearch," 2015) that has a
Kibana("Kibana," 2015) frontend engine. The data in this system can subsequently be queried using
customised Kibana frontend queries. The utilisation of the Kibana frontend allows the user to create
many custom views of the data, allowing for detection of anomaly and threat. Demonstrative figures
extracted from Kibana are included later in this paper.
GAINING ACCESS
To gain access to these honeypot systems, the correct username and password must be entered at the
emulated login screen, as would be the case for a real system. While general user accounts on well
administered systems may have lockout of the account for unsuccessful attempts, it is not a feature
that is enabled on administrative and root accounts at any time. The reason being that repeated
deliberate unsuccessful login attempts can result in a denial of service, thereby locking out access of
administrative or root accounts. The lack of an account lockout for unsuccessful password attempts is
the Achilles heel of availability for administrative accounts or system accounts, and can be routinely
exploited by the use of automated attack tools. The generic tool used for this type of activity is called
colloquially a password cracker.
Passwords crackers can be deployed to identify the correct password by trying different passwords
against the particular service or system. It should be noted that the rate of password attempts is
reaching billions of passwords a second when using multi CPU- or GPU-enabled password crackers,
with the limiting factor being that of the target machine speed in terms of network or processing
power.
There is a finite number of passwords for any given system password implementation, often referred
to as a key space, and while finite, these key spaces can be computationally large. For example, the

standard Windows LM password key space for all possible passwords is 2 43. While it is relatively
infeasible for a single conventional computer to derive these passwords in a timely fashion, this does
not hold true for advanced techniques using compute clustering or GPU technology that can factor
these passwords at the rate of billions per second. Furthermore, techniques such as pre-computed
rainbow tables (Oechslin, 2003) can greatly increase speed, as the key space is computed once and
each possible password stored as a hash within a database table or binary file structure for easy reuse.
The limiting factor then becomes the speed at which the password hash can be compared against
every entry in the rainbow table database.
Passwords are typically stored in file structures as a cryptographic hash or set length ciphered text,
and not as plaintext. Without the use of hashing and cryptography, compromise of the password is
trivial. Compromise is achieved by simply opening the file that contains the password and reading it.
To increase the security of passwords, they are usually protected by applying a cryptographic process
to the password, with the resulting output referred to as a hash.. In this format, the probability of an
attacker obtaining or guessing the password on a first guess is very low. The MD5 hash algorithm is a
common method employed to achieve password obfuscation in this manner (Marechal, 2008).
There are different techniques that can be used to break or crack passwords. A brute force attack uses
a systematic method of guessing the password by enumerating through a combination of characters,
symbols and numbers of the allowable characters. A dictionary attack creates hashes of words that
appear in a dictionary, and compares them to the stored password or feeds the hash as input to the
login mechanism of a live system. The former method is commonly referred to as an offline attack,
and the later as a live attack. Rainbow tables are databases comprised of various character
combinations that have been pre-computed and stored typically in an efficient binary structure,
allowing fast retrieval. Password techniques that utilise plaintext wordlists can also be deployed.
These types of attack tend to utilise social engineering techniques and deductive reasoning to pick
viable candidate passwords. In some cases, these are provided as defaults with the security software
distribution or attack utilities used in, for example, Kali. Evidence from the (Rabadia & Valli, 2014)
paper proves use of these password lists by attackers. Kippo facilitates the use of these default
passwords to produce a list of acceptable passwords.
ATTACKER BEHAVIOUR POST-COMPROMISE
After achieving login on an account, an attacker will typically want to have administrative control of
the device, also referred to as “owning” the system. The attacker then typically downloads malicious
code and executes it, compromising the machine with infected binaries or privilege escalations that
allow for remote administrative access of the machine. Achieving remote access allows provides
persistent access and allows the cyber-criminal to use the compute device for their own activities at
will.

By design, the kippo honeypot allows all of this malicious activity to occur i.e. if the attacker logs in
they are able to interact with a fake shell and download files to honeypot. The files are downloaded
using wget functionality and stored in a sandbox for later retrieval and examination by the honeypot
operator.
Apart from logging and recording the shell interactions, as attack activity occurs kippo also extracts
other relevant artefacts from the sessions with the attacker. As mentioned previously, one such
artefact is the presented SSH signature from the session that can be used to identify the attacking
entity by its digital fingerprint. This fingerprint information was instrumental in detecting a significant
change in SSH malicious activity since this research commenced in late 2011.
In addition to the kippo honeypot software, all of the honeypot systems use p0f, a passive operating
system fingerprinting tool (Zalewski, 2015). This program works by looking at the TCP transmission
and TCP/IP stack responses, and tries to determine the attacker’s operating system through
fingerprinting and signature matching. A commonly used offensive tool nmap works on similar
principles of operation. The major difference is that the p0f program does so passively, while nmap is
proactive and sends packets to the target.
The story so far
The kippo honeynet in this research had been in existence since early 2011 and has expanded with the
addition of new sensors. There are now 22 sensors in total which are spread physically around the
globe. There are VPS servers located in USA, Germany, Netherlands, Singapore, Australia and the
Philippines, and as previously mentioned these are all installed on a maintained Ubuntu LTS (Long
Term Support) platform which is currently Ubuntu 14.04 LTS. In addition to VPS assets, there are
ADSL based honeypots deployed in Australia. These utilise Raspberry Pi implementations as well as
i686 based Ubuntu servers that have identical configuration to the VPS servers.
The project detected a wide range of SSH fingerprint signatures as shown in Table 1 prior to 12 th
November 2014, totalling approximately 1.2 million interactions, increasing to 18.6 million
interactions by 5th Mar 2015 (Table 2). The attackers that had connected to the honeypots prior to the
12th November 2014 had predominantly been Unix/Unix-Like signatures as shown in Table 1, with a
predominance of the Kali and BackTrack Linux distributions representing 99% of all malicious login
attempts on the honeypots using the libssh2 libraries.
Table 1 – Top 10 SSH Signatures detected by honeypots
1
2
3
4
5

SSH-2.0-libssh2_1.4.2
SSH-2.0-libssh2_1.4.3
SSH-2.0-libssh2_1.4.1
SSH-2.0-JSCH-0.1.51
SSH-2.0-libssh2_1.4.0

825729
342920
7101
4390
2230

6
7
8
9
10

SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_5.2
1530
SSH-2.0-paramiko_1.8.1
1157
SSH-2.0-libssh2_1.0
843
SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_6.0p1 Debian- 322
SSH-2.0-libssh2_1.4.3 PHP
134
4+deb7u2
Total
1186356
Table 2 - Top 10 SSH Signatures until 05/03/2015
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

SSH-2.0-PUTTY
SSH-2.0-libssh2_1.4.2
SSH-2.0-libssh2_1.4.3
SSH-2.0-libssh-0.1
SSH-2.0-libssh2_1.4.1
SSH-2.0-JSCH-0.1.51
SSH-2.0-PuTTY_Release_0.63
SSH-2.0-libssh-0.4.8
SSH-2.0-libssh2_1.4.0
SSH-2.0-JSCH-0.1.44
Total

12477973
3536116
1853226
310530
225762
65791
51646
37160
9131
6472
18573807

As of March 5th (Table 2) these Linux signatures only represented 30.2% of all malicious login
attempts. At that point in time, the dominate signature was that of SSH-2.0-PUTTY, which
represented 67.1% of all attempts.
It should be noted that the SSH-2.0-PUTTY signature had not been previously seen on the honeynets
prior to 27th October, 2014, when there was an observation of 10 connections in a relatively short
period of time. The next significant event was on the 13th November where 69 attempts were
recorded. A significant increase in the use of the tool commenced on the 22nd November, where
13,788 attempts were made from a /24 network. This /24 was not initially able to be identified on IP
based geolocation databases, but it is now identified as apparently originating from China. Initial
traceroute reconnaissance by the researcher also indicated that the traffic was propagating from
Chinese mainland assets. The other interesting part to note about the traffic was that prior to 12th
November there was less than 20 contacts in total from that /24 IP address space over the entire period
of operation of the honeynet. A histogram of all attacks with the signature SSH-2.0-PUTTY is show
in Figure 1

Figure 1 – Histogram of login attempts against all honeypot sensors where the SSH-2.0-PUTTY
client was used
All IPs within the particular /24 still have daily contact with the honeynet, with the total number of
attempts ranging from 0 ~ 50,000 on any given day from single IPs in that network address range.
Figure 1 is the histogram for that time period, and represents 14130288 logins with only 42236
successful or 0.30% success.
The attack “network” has grown significantly as the attackers have compromised machines globally.
Initial contact with the honeypots with the SSH-2.0-PUTTY client signature was restricted to the
same /24, but as they successfully compromised machines they in turn started to contact the honeynet
nodes. Contact from nodes other than the /24 numbered 210,159 and the following figure (Figure 2)
shows the geographic spread of these contacts.

Figure 2 – Geographic spread of new attackers attacking the honeypot sensor network
The top 5 countries identified as attacking the honeynet are 73341, France 25643, USA 15416,
Turkey 7509 and Brazil 6472. This is reflected pictorially in decreasing shades of green i.e largest =
darker shade. It should be noted that while these are attackers that are seen by the 22 nodes in the
honeynet, this is not an exhaustive mechanism. However, given that modus operandi of the repeated
multiple attempts from the new members of the attack network is consistent with the “original” /24, it
seems likely that it is the same. The bruteforce nature of the attempts indicate automated bruteforce
retries of logins. When login was achieved the packet captures also evince high repetitious reuse of
the same script or code signatures to attack the systems once compromised.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
These attacks are ongoing and persistent now for over four months, and appear to be increasing in
magnitude over time. The attack would appear to be relatively non-sophisticated, repetitive, verbose
and inefficient.
From analysis of the collected data it would appear that the attacking entities are not sharing attack
data, and the attacks are noisy and not as efficient and optimised. One possible explanation for this is
that the honeypots are not responding back to or potentially providing “alive” tokens to the attacking
entity, as we are not running the malcode they download. This lack of response by the honeypots
could be the causation of the retries by the attackers. This aside, the logic employed would appear to
be:”if the compromise of the box was successful i.e we were able to login and successfully download
the malfeasant code, then leave alone.” However, the observed behaviour was:”if code has not
deployed successfully because we do not have control, then, re-attempt installation”. This finding has
implications for honeypot design sophistication and deployment, and is a valuable outcome in of
itself. To prevent this behaviour, a method for sending “false positives” back to the attacking entity
mimicking command and control would need to be developed.
This pattern of reattempted compromise in this occurrence is consistent with the intention of a
honeypot, which is to exhaust or distract resources away from legitimate targets through deception.
Every retried compromise and install represents resource usage by the attackers. This usage includes,
but is not limited to, actual machine run time, consumption of network bandwidth and scanning
activities, all of which consume finite resources on the part of the attacker. In addition to resource
wastage the activity provides, with every attempt, more evidence of the actual attack and in most
cases would represent repeat criminal offences.
Of interest is the observation more recently of the initial use and subsequent significant increase of
attacks using the Putty SSH tool. Further, it was observed that a significant quantity of these attacks
apparently originated in China. There may be a number of likely reasons as to why this was observed,
but one hypothesis is that the attackers leveraged compromised Windows operating system computers
in China as the initial attack platform. Data suggests that the majority of computers in China are
running Windows, with most of these copies are pirated and largely unpatched and thus are insecure
and susceptible to compromise themselves (Popa, 2015). Use of compromised computers as a third
party attack platform is not uncommon, as it makes it harder to identify the true origin of a cyberattack(Livadas, Walsh, Lapsley, & Strayer, 2006). This does call into question whether these attacks
are truly originating in China, as has been suggested in previous honeypot research (Pouget & Dacier,
2004).
Further research is being conducted now on the downloaded payloads from the attacking entities. One
of the features of the honeynet is that it will download, check the md5 sum of the file, and if it already
exists will discard the download. This is advantageous in these cases as otherwise there would be
significant storage implications for this research alone.
There is also data with respect to detected OS fingerprints for attacking entities which will be
presented in further research papers.
Finally, the honeynet is functioning as it should, and this particular persistent attack has and continues
to yield significant data for analysis and interpretation.
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